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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a sequel to an earlier result of the authors that in making inferences 
from certain probabilistic knowledge bases the maximum entropy inference process, 
ME, is the only inference process respecting "common sense." This result was criticized 
on the grounds that the probabilistic knowledge bases considered are unnatural and that 
ignorance of dependence shouM not be identified with statistical independence. We 
argue against hese criticisms and also against he more general criticism that ME is 
representation dependent. In a final section, however, we provide a criticism of our 
own of ME, and of inference processes in general, namely that they fail to satisfy 
compactness. © 1997 Elsevier Science Inc. 
KEYWORDS:  maximum entropy, inference process, probabilistic reasoning, 
uncertain reasoning 
INTRODUCTION AND NOTATION 
In [1] we gave a justification of the maximum entropy inference process, 
ME, by characterizing it as the unique probabilistic inference process 
satisfying a certain collection of common sense principles. In the years 
following that publication a number of criticisms of these principles, of the 
framework in which they are set, and of ME in general have been brought 
to our notice. It is our intention in this paper to address some of these 
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points. Briefly, in the next three sections we shall consider the following 
criticisms: 
1. That the maximum entropy inference process is representation 
dependent. 
2. That the types of knowledge bases used in the proof of the main 
characterization theorem are overly general and unnatural. 
3. That the identification of ignorance of dependence with probabilistic 
independence is unreasonable and unjustified. 
In a fourth section we shall consider a further, and possibly more 
serious, criticism of ME (and, as it turns out, of inference processes in 
general) which does not appear to be so widely appreciated, namely its 
incompactness: the impossibility in general of separating out from a large 
knowledge base a small subset encompassing the "essential knowledge" 
about some particular feature. 
Before we can do that, however, we shall introduce some notation and 
recall the list of principles appearing in [1] in order to make this paper 
largely self-contained. 
Throughout, L will stand for a countable propositional language with 
propositional variables A t,/12 . . . . .  SL will denote the sentences of L, and 
SL(/1ia, . . . .  eli,) will denote the set of sentences of the finite sublanguage 
of L with (distinct) propositional variables /1i,, . . . .  /1i,. We will use 0, qS, 
q~, etc. to denote sentences. Let B(A~,, . . . .  /1~,) stand for the Lindenbaum 
algebra on SL(/1i,, . . . .  A~,), so the elements of this algebra are the 
equivalence classes 
-0 = {qb ~ SL(A~,,  . . . .  /1 i )  I ch =- 0), 
where 0 ~ SL(/1i,,  . . . .  Ai°) and -= stands, as usual, for logical equiva- 
lence. The operations of complement (~) ,  meet (A), and join (v )  are 
defined by 
~O= ~0,  0A q~= 0A q~, 0V ~b= 0V q~. 
As usual, g is an isomorphism between B(/1i, ,  . . . .  A i )  and 
B( /1j,, . . . .  /1jm ), written 
g : B (A i , ,  . . . .  /1i,,) = B(A j , ,  . . . .  /1j.) ,  
if g is a bijection from {010 e SL(Ai , ,  . . . .  /1i.)} to {0r 0 
SL(/1j,, . . . .  /1jm)} (so, necessarily, n = m), such that for all 0,~b 
SL(/1i~, . . . .  e l i ) ,  
g(~--O) = ~g(O) ,  g(O~--~)  =g(0)  Ag(~) ,  
g(0--U--~) = g(0)  V g (3) .  
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An automorphism of B( Ail . . . . .  Ai ) is an isomorphism of B( Ai,, .... Ai°) 
with itself. The (distinct) atoms of the Boolean algebra B(Ai, . . . . .  A , )  are 
the equivalence classes of the 2 n sentences of SL(Ai,, . . . .  A~.) of the form 
q-Ai, A ++_ Ai2 A "" A ± A i .  , and, this being a finite Boolean algebra, every 
element is a join of these atoms. Hence,  since an automorphism of 
B(Ai, . . . . .  A~°) must map atoms to atoms, it is clear that every automor-  
phism determines a unique permutat ion of the atoms, and conversely every 
permutat ion  of the atoms determines  a unique automorph ism.  
In what follows therefore we shall specify automorphisms imply by 
their actions on the atoms. We shall also refer to these sentences 
_+Ai~ A +_ A~, A --- A +A~, as the atoms of SL(A~, . . . . .  Ai).  Notice then 
that every sentence of-SL(Ai,, .... A i )  is logically equivalent o a disjunc- 
tion of these atoms. 
A probability function of SL [and similarly for SL(Ail . . . . .  Ai)] is a 
function w : SL ~ [0, 1] such that for all 0, ~b ~ SL [SL(A~, . . . . .  Ai°)], 
(i) if 0 - ~b then w(O) = w(ch), 
(ii) if ~ 0 thenw(0)= l and w(~ 0) --- 0, 
( i i i )  if ~ 7(0  A ~b) then  w(O v oh) = w(O) + w(qb). 
[This list is rather longer than we need (see [2, p. 10]), but is convenient 
here.] 
We shall use w, w0, etc. for probabil ity functions throughout. 
Notice that, by (ii), since any sentence in SL(Ai,, .... Ai ) is logically 
equivalent to a disjunction of atoms of SL(A i . . . . .  A i ), the values of a 
probabil ity function w on the sentences in SL('Ai,, . . . .  ~1,) [where w is a 
probabil ity function possibly defined on some language larger than 
SL(Ai,, .... Ai) ,  for example SL] are determined by the values of w on 
the atoms of SL(A~,.. . ,  Aio). We shall use this fact extensively in what 
follows without further mention. 
A set S of linear constraints on a probabil ity function w on 
SL(A~, . . . . .  A~) is a set of equations 
{ ~ aijw(Oj)= ~i i= 1 .... ,m} 
j= l  
where the 0j ~ SL(A i l  , . . . .  Ai )  , the Ogij , ~i are real, and the w is to be 
thought of as a variable standing for the probabil ity function on 
SL(Ail, .... Ai) .  We say that such a set of constraints S is consistent if it 
is satisfied by some probabil ity function w on SL(Ai , , . . . ,A i ) .  Let 
CRL(Ai, . . . . .  Ai°) denote the set of such consistent sets S of l inear 
constraints, and let CQL(A~I . . . . .  A i )  denote the set of S 
CL(A~,, . . . .  A~°) for which the coefficients o~/ are rational. In [1] we used 
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CL where we are now using CQL. In this paper we shall use CL to stand 
for either CRL or CQL, being more specific only when it is necessary to 
distinguish the two cases. 
Let CL = U~ I CL(A1 . . . . .  An), etc. An inference process is a function 
N defined on CL such that for S ~ CL, N(S)  is a probability function on 
SL which satisfies S. 1 
For the purpose of this paper we are interested in the maximum entropy 
inference process, ME, which is defined as follows: Given S ~ CL, 0 ~ SL, 
pick m such that S ~ CL(A  1 . . . . .  Am)  , ~ IE  SL(A 1 . . . . .  Am) .  Let 
C 1 . . . . .  C2,, run through the atoms of SL(A 1 . . . . .  Mm) , and let 
k 
0 =- V ci~. 
j -1  
Then 
k 
ME(S) (0 )  = • w(Ci, ), 
j= l  
where w is the probability function on SL(A1 , . . . ,  A m) satisfying S for 
which the entropy, 
- ~ w(C i) log w(Ci), 
i= l  
is maximal. (For a proof that this definition is independent of the particu- 
lar m chosen, and further background iscussion about this inference 
process, we refer the reader to [2, Chapter 6].) 
Briefly, the idea behind the definition of an inference process is that we 
are identifying a rational agent's knowledge in a particular area with a set 
of constraints S ~ CL and supposing that, when required to make a 
decision, the agent applies some inference process N to S in order to fill in 
belief values, as subjectice probabilities, to the sentences of L. [It is 
importance to emphasize that in this paper we equate belief with willing- 
ness to act, or bet, in a situation where a decision has to be made on the 
basis of the available knowledge. The belief values that the agent arrives at 
are purely subjective; there is no sense in which they are right or wrong 
(assuming, as we do, that they are all simultaneously consistent with the 
knowledge base). However, there may well be a sense in which they could 
i In later work, e.g. [2], inference processes were also treated as functions of the overlying 
language, which in that case could be taken to be finite. In the presence of language 
in•ariance (see [2, p. 73]) these two notions are equivalent. 
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be said to be rational, or commonsensical, and it is against these criteria 
that we would wish to judge them.] 
Essentially then, we can, for this purpose, think of the agent as an 
inference process, so that "common sense" requirements on the agent 
correspond to principles which the function N should ideally satisfy. It is 
important o appreciate in these principles that the constraint set S is 
supposed to sum up all the agent's knowledge (in a particular area). (We 
refer the reader to [1] and [2] for a fuller discussion and justification of 
these principles.) 
The following eight principles applying to an inference process N were 
introduced in [1]. 
P1. EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLE If  51, 52 E CL are equivalent in the sense 
that a probability function w satisfies $1 just if it satisfies $2, then 
N(S1)  = N(S2) .  
P2. RENAMING PRINCIPLE Let g" B(Ai,  , . . . .  Ai ) --- B( Aj, . . . . .  A j ) ,  and 
suppose that S 1 ~ CL(Ah,  . . . .  Ai°),  S 2 ~ CL(A j ,  . . . .  , A t )  are such that 
. . . . .  m/' 
where g(_-Oj) = 4)j fo r  j = 1 . . . . .  k .  Then  N(S, XO) = N(S2X4) )  whenever 
g(0) = 4~. 
P3. IRRELEVANT INFORMATION PRINCIPLE Let S 1 ~ CL(A i l ,  . . . , A i  ) , 
S 2 ~ CL(A j , ,  . . . .  Aim) with {il . . . . .  i n} c~ {Jl . . . . .  Jm} = G. Then for 0~ 
SL(Ai~,  . . . .  A i  ), N(Sa) (O)  = N(S  1 + Sz)(O).  
P4. RELATIVISATION PRINCIPLE Suppose that $1, S 2 ~ CL  are respec- 
tively the sets of constraints 
~,~w(o~ A 4") = t~, 
J 
E OlijW(Oj A ~) = ~}i' 
J 
w(4, )  = 3', ~ aktw(q,, A -7 4') = ~k, 
l 
W( ~¢) ) = ]/, E "l'sqW( "q A ~ ~) ) = A s. 
q 
Then for 0 ~ SL,  N(S1XO A f~) = N(S2XO A dp). 
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P5. OBSTINACY PRINCIPLE If S 1, S 2 ~ CL and N(S  1) satisfies 82, then 
N(S1) = N(S  1 + $2). 
P6. INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE For the particular case of S being the 
set of constraints 
w(A 1 /xA  3)=a,  w(A 1 /xA  3)=/3 ,  w(A3)=3 '  (3 '>0) ,  
N(S) (A  1 A A 2 A A 3) = oz/3/3'. 
P7. OPEN-MINDEDNESS PRINCIPLE If S ~ CL, 0 ~ SL, and S + 
w(O) > 0 is consistent, hen N(S)(O)  4= O. 
P8. CONTINUITY N is continuous as a function of affine sets. 
We refer the reader to [2] for a fuller discussion of continuity in this 
context. In fact, for the new results in this paper, it is sufficient that for 
S ~ CL(Ai , ,  . . . .  Ain) being 
and 0 ~ SL(Ai l ,  . . . .  Ai°), N(SXO)  is continuous in the /3i (for fixed 
0j., %). 
All the principles P l -8  hold for ME. Indeed, in [1] we show the 
following result. 
THEOREM 1 Let N satisfy P1-7 for CL = CQL.  Then on CQL, N = ME. 
It is interesting to note that we do not need to assume continuity (P8) in 
this theorem. If we do assume continuity, then, by a fairly straightforward 
use of the density of the rationals in the reals, we can extend the theorem 
from CQL to CRL. At the same time the open-mindedness principle 
becomes derivable. Precisely: 
THEOREM 2 Let N satisfy P1-6 and P8 ( for  CL = CRL or CQL ). Then 
on CL, N = ME. 
We are now ready to address the criticisms (1)-(3) of ME listed earlier. 
After that we shall go on to consider the issue to compactness, not simply 
for ME but for inference processes in general. 
REPRESENTATION DEPENDENCE 
The maximum entropy inference process, ME, is frequently criticized for 
not being representation independent, that is, the value it gives on a 
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knowledge base depends on exactly how this knowledge is formulated as a 
set of constraints S ~ CL .  A typical argument one hears is the following: 
-k If we have no information at all about a proposition A 1 (so S = O in 
1 this case), then ME gives value ME(Q3)(A l) = ~ to the probability of 
A 1. However suppose now that A 1 is actually a disjunction, A 2 V A3,  
3 say. Then ME gives value ME(Q3)(A 2 v A3) = ~ to AI! 
As far as we can see, there are two explanations for why the speaker 
thinks this paradoxical. The first, and less charitable, is that the speaker 
has failed to appreciate the underlying assumptions on which the use of 
ME in this context is based, namely that the knowledge base S must 
contain all the agent's relevant knowledge, in the case in question, about 
A1. If the agent knows absolutely nothing about A 1 then taking S = ~3 is 
correct and, given that the agent is obliged to give an answer, by any sort 
of symmetry argument it would be hard to quibble with the inferred 
1 probability of ~ for A 1. 
On the other hand, if the speaker knows, or subsequently learns, that 
A~ is a disjunction of A 2 and A3, then this (and any other knowledge 
about A 1, A2, A 3) should be included in S. If it turns out that A 1 being a 
disjunction of A 2 and A 3 is absolutely all the speaker knows about A~, 
A2, A3, then s /he  should take 
S = {w(A  1 ~ (A 2 v A3)) = 1} 
(instead of S = 0)  and, assuming s /he  follows common sense as formu- 
lated in [1], infer a value 
ME({w(A 1 <--> (A 2 VA3))  = 1})(A~) - 
for the probability of A 1. 
1 That this answer has changed from the earlier value of ~ is not 
paradoxical, because the agent's conception of A 1 is entirely determined 
by h is /her  knowledge, and from the agent's point of view his /her  knowl- 
edge has changed. The fact that, from the outside, we may believe that A~ 
and A 2 v A 3 are the same thing is no reason to expect that our agent, 
despite lacking any knowledge of it (or even, possibly, the language in 
which to express it), will somehow also respect his identity. 
Of course, in the real world it is rather hand to produce propositions 
about which we know absolutely nothing. Indeed for almost any "natural" 
proposition we care to think of, we already have so many beliefs and so 
much knowledge related to it that it verges on the unrealistic to suppose 
that we could ever collect it all into some S. However, that is not a 
problem with maximum entropy; it is a problem with the real world. A 
consequence of this difficulty is that in practice the source of ~t will 
frequently choose as A 1 a proposition about which we in fact have a great 
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deal of prior knowledge, for example "there is life on Mars," and, by 
omitting to include any of it in S, conclude that it follows by maximum 
entropy that there is life on Mars with probability i t  2" 
What, it would seem, the speaker would wish to be true of the maximum 
entropy inference process is that it should satisfy the following atomicity 
principle: 
Let 0 ~ SL(A : :  . . . .  Aik) be neither a tautology nor contradictory. 
Let S ~ CL(A  i, Ai, . . . . .  Ai°), qb ~ SL(Ai ,  Ai, . . . . .  Ai ), where 
i, jl . . . . .  Jk, il . . . . .  i n are all distinct, and let 4~ °, S o be the result of 
substituting 0 for A i everywhere in ~b, S, respectively. Then N(S)(~b) 
= N(S°)(  q~°). 
Unfortunately, as shown in [2], this principle is inconsistent, although 
interestingly it does hold for ME if we add the extra requirement that 
w(A i) = b is in S for some b. [As Halpern and Koller have shown, this 
problem does not go away even if we require of our inference processes 
only that they select a (nontrivial) set of probability functions satisfying 
the constraints, rather than a unique solution as we do. We refer the 
reader to [3] for further details.] 
As in the example above, the atomicity principle fails in general for 
ME because the additional information that A i is equivalent o 0 is 
omitted. As the following theorem shows, it is enough to include this 
information. 
THEOREM 3 Let O, c~, qb o, etc. be as in the statement of the atomicity 
principle. Then 
ME(S°)(ch °) = ME(S + {w(A i ~ 0) = 1})(~b). 
Proof By the irrelevant information principle, P3, 
ME(S°)(ch °) = ME(S ° + {w(A i) = 1})(~b°). 
Let D 1 . . . .  , D2 .  enumerate the atoms 
-t-Ai~ A +Ai2 A "" A ±Ain 
of SL(Ai , ,  . . . .  A i )  , and similarly let E 1 . . . . .  E2k enumerate the atoms of 
SL(A  h . . . . .  Ajk). Without loss of generality, we may assume that 0--- 
V~= 1 E:. Let g be the automorphism of B(A  i, All, . . . .  Ai°, Ah, . . . .  A j )  
that transposes the atoms 
D~ A E: A ±Ai, D~ A E: A -T-A~ 
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of this algebra whenever j > s, and leaves all other atoms fixed. Then 
g(~)  = q/ for ~O ~ B(Ai .  . . . . .  Ai, ,, A j, . . . . .  Aj~) and 
g(A i )  =g( (A  i A O) v (A  i A ~0) )  =(A  i A O) A (--1A i A ~0)  
=Ai  <--~ O , 
so by P1 and P2, 
ME(S  ° + {w(A i) = 1})(4) °) = ME(S  ° + {w(A i ~ 0) = 1})(4) °) 
= ME(S  + {w(A i ~ 0) = 1})(4)), 
since if w is a probabil ity function on SL(A  i, Ai,, . . . .  A i ,  Aja, . . . .  ASk) 
such that w(A i ( - - )0 )= 1, then by induction on the length of ~b 
SL(A i ,  Ai ,  . . . . .  A i .  ,A j i  . . . . .  A jk)  , w(~)  = w(~°) .  • 
By examining this proof  it is clear that the theorem also applies to any 
inference process satisfying irrelevant information, equivalence, and P2. 
Despite this rather straightforward refutation of the so-called represen- 
tation dependence of the maximum entropy inference process, several 
attempts have been made to address this (non)problem. 
Perhaps the most widespread is the claim that using instead minimum 
cross-entropy is the answer. This may seem a rather surprising claim, given 
that maximum entropy is a special case of min imum cross-entropy, so we 
shall spend a little t ime introducing the concepts and explaining how this 
misunderstanding arises. 
Let w 0 be some prior probability function on SL, and assume for the 
present that w 0 is positive, that is, w0(0) > 0 whenever 0 is noncontradic- 
tory. The min imum cross-entropy inference process (relative to w0), CEW% 
is defined on S~CL,  ~O~SL as follows. Let m be such that S 
CL(A  1 . . . . .  Am)  , ~0 ~ SL(A  l . . . . .  Am), let C 1 . . . .  ,C2m run through the 
atoms of SL(A  1 . . . . .  Am), and let 
Then 
k 
-- V Ci;. 
j= l  
k 
CEwo(S) (~)  = ~ w(Ci~), 
j= l  
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where w is the probabi l i ty function on SL(A  1 . . . . .  A m) satisfying S for 
which the cross-entropy relative to w 0, 
2 'n w(C i  ) 
w(C i) log - -  (1) 
i -  1 wo(Ci) ' 
is minimal.  As for the inference process ME, this definit ion can be shown 
to be independent  of the part icular  m chosen. It can be extended 
to w 0 not necessari ly posit ive provided we are willing to restrict the 
domain  of CE w'' to those S for which there is a solution w satisfying 
w(C i) = 0 whenever  wo(C i) = 0 [equivalently, to S for which S + {w(0) = 
0 I wo(O) = O, 0 ~ SL(A  1 . . . . .  .4m)} is consistent] and agreeing that for C i 
such that wo(C ) = 0 the corresponding term in (1) is zero if w(C i) = 0 
and infinity otherwise. So for such a knowledge base S, the minimizing 
choice is a probabi l i ty function w for which w(C i) = 0 whenever wo(C i) = 
0. Fur thermore ,  since every sentence of 0 E SL(A~ . . . . .  /t  m) is equivalent 
to a disjunction of atoms of SL(A~ . . . . .  A, , ) ,  w(O) will also have to be zero 
whenever w0(0) is zero. 
Clearly, ME = CE u, where u is the uniform prior which, for each m and 
C i as above, gives u(C i) = 2 m. 
In an especial ly simple case the argument hat min imum cross-entropy 
does not suffer the failing of representat ion dependence runs as follows: 
Suppose that w 0 is our chosen (positive) pr ior  probabi l i ty function. Then 
CE~"(Q) (A I )  = wo(A1).  
(At this stage we do not need to know all of wo; just knowing its value 
on A~ suffices.) Now suppose that A l is actually A2 /~ A3 [i.e. that 
A 1 ,,--, (A  2 v A 3) is true]. Then 
CEW',(Q3)(A2 V A 3) = wo(A 2 V A 3) 
= wo(A1),  
because, since A l and A 2 v A 3 are actually the same thing, 
wo(A 1) - wo(A 2 v A3). 
The sleight of hand here, of course, is that w 0 must have been chosen 
in the first place (or refined, if we assume that initially w 0 was only 
specif ied on A~) to respect the equivalence of A~ and A 2 x /A 3. In 
part icular  then, if w 0 has to be specif ied at the start, it would be 
necessary to presage the equivalence of A~ with A 2 v A 3 (and in 
consequence deny the equivalence of A~ with, say, ~ A 2 /~ ~ A3), 
which scarcely corresponds to the situation of "zero information"! If w 0 
does not have this p roper ty - - say ,  if w 0 = u (which seems appropr iate  in 
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a situation of genuine zero information)--then the so-called representa- 
tion independence fails, just as it fails for ME. 
Building on this simple example, notice that once the information that 
A 1 and A 2 v A 3 "are the same thing" is included in w 0 [i.e., wo(A 1 
(A 2 VA3))= 1], then w0(-~(A 1 ~ (A  z VA3)))= 0. Thus w 0 is not 
positive, and the restrictions on the domain of CE ~0 given above force 
that CE w0 can be applied only to knowledge bases S that are consistent 
with 
{w(o) = o l wo(O) = o) 
[which in particular contains w(-~(A  1 ~ (A 2 v A3))) = 0] and on such 
knowledge bases must, as explained above, give 
CEw°(S) ( -~(A1 ~ (A 2 V A3))) = 0, 
equivalently, 
CEw0(S)(A1 ~ (A 2 V A3)) = 1. 
Essentially, then the "missing information" that 
w(A 1 ~ (A 2 v A3)) = 1 
is now being included in w 0 rather than in S. And just as the "paradox 
of representation dependence" disappears if we include this information 
in S with ME, so it disappears if we include this information in w 0 (or 
S) with CE w0. 
A reason for the popularity of CE wo is now clear. In the case of 
categorical knowledge [i.e. of the form w(0) = 1, or 0] it allows one to 
be negligent and omit it from S provided that the omissions are covered 
in w o. However it in no sense "solves" the so-called problem of repre- 
sentation dependence; it merely provides a safety net for the careless. 
Generalizing the above discussion shows that in any particular in- 
stance such a restriction on w 0 is sufficient o ensure that the conclusion 
of the atomicity principle holds for CE w0. Precisely: 
THEOREM 4 Let O, dp, qb °, etc. be as in the statement o f  the atomicity 
principle, and let w o be a probability function on SL such that wo( A i 
O) = 1. Then for S in the domain of  CE w°, 
CEWo(S)( q~ ) = CEWo(SO)( qbo). 
Proof As we observed above, CEwo(S)(Ai  ~ 0) = 1, so the minimizing 
probability function in the cross-entropy expression also satisfies the 
constraint 
w(A i ~ O) = 1. 
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Hence 
CEW°(S)(th) = CE~0(S + {w(A i ~ 0) = 1})(4,) 
= CEW°(S ° + {w(A  i ~ 0) = 1})(~b°), 
since, as observed earlier, if w(A i ~ 0)= 1 then w(O)= w($  °) for 
E SL(A i ,  Ai, , . . . .  A i , ,A j , ,  . . . .  Aj~). Again, by the same argument as 
above, 
CEwo(s° ) (A i  ~ O) = 1, 
SO 
CE~°(S °) = CE~"(S ° + {w(A i ~ 0) = 1}), 
and the result follows. • 
There are several other approaches to this question of uncertain infer- 
ence and representation i dependence that we mention briefly. The first is 
due to Halpern and Koller [3]. Using a slightly different notion of proba- 
bilistic inference to the inferences processes we have been considering 
(their inference procedures pick out a set of probability functions, rather 
than a unique function as with our inference processes) they obtain some 
negative results similar in flavor to the failure of the atomicity principle 
and, by providing a rather general analysis, show that by using minimum 
cross-entropy it is possible under certain circumstances to provide infer- 
ence procedures which are closed under reasonable families of representa- 
tion shifts. We refer the reader to [3] for details. 
A second, recent "remedy" for the "paradox of representation depend- 
ence" is given by Jaeger in [4]. As in [3], Jaeger's inference processes, or 
measure selection functions as he calls them, are only required to pick a 
set of probability functions (rather than a unique probability function) 
satisfying the constraints. Jaeger gives a formalization of what it means for 
a measure selection function to be (relatively) representation i dependent 
and shows how to derive a representation i dependent measure selection 
function [ from any (dimension independent) measure selection function 
I. Roughly, the idea is that for a set of constraints S, [ (S)  is defined to be 
I (S - ) ,  where S -  is the "simplest" set of constraints from which S could 
arise by a change of representation. [Actually, in the case considered 
earlier of S = ;~, S ~ CL, ME(S) is the set of all probability functions on 
SL, so the "problem" never even arises.] We refer the interested reader to 
[4]. (For a rather more radical solution, this time involving imprecise 
probabilities, see [5].) 
We now suggest an alternative xplanation as to why the source of -A- 
may feel it to be paradoxical. This is that the speaker is not saying that 
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s /he  was aware all along that A 1 was actually a disjunction (and failed to 
make this knowledge xplicit), but that s /he  could certainly imagine that 
A 1 was, or might be, a disjunction (and might indeed feel that by some 
artificial contrivance it would always be possible to make A1 look like a 
disjunction), and that so doing would alter the value that the maximum 
entropy inference process would give to A 1. Of course, as we have already 
seen, turning imagining into fact in this way certainly would change the 
value. However, if s /he  could imagine A 1 to be a disjunction, then surely 
s /he  could equally easily imagine A 1 to be a conjunction, an implication, 
etc. And would it not be irrational to entertain in this way the idea that A 1 
was a disjunction without at the same time entertaining the idea that A~ 
was also a conjunction, an implication, etc. 
Notice that, by Theorem 3, the effect of assuming A~ to be a disjunction 
of the new propositional variables A2,  A 3 amounts to replacing ME(S) by 
ME(S + {w(A 1 <--, (A 2 v A 3) = 1}). Our next theorem shows that if we do 
introduce all such "imaginary" forms for Aa simultaneously, then they all 
balance out as far as ME is concerned. Precisely: 
THEOREM 5 Let S ~ CL(A i ,  AiL . . . . .  A i )  , qb ~ SL(A i ,  Ai, . . . . .  A i ) .  
Let q~i' J = 1 . . . . .  q enumerate the nontautological, noncontradictory sen- 
tences of  SL (A  1 . . . . .  Ar)  up to logical equivalence (so q = 2 2~ - 2), and 
let Oj be the result of  replacing A 1 . . . . .  A r everywhere in tpj by As~ . . . . .  Asl 
respectively, where i and the i m and sit are all distinct (so that ch and the Oj 
are all sentences from entirely disjoint languages). Then 
ME(S)(~b) = ME(S  + {w(A i *'-> O j )=1 I J =1 . . . . .  q})(~b) 
Proof Without loss of generality we may assume that for m = 
1 . . . . .  q /2 ,  tp2m = ~ qJ2m-l" For j = 1 . . . . .  q, let C i , . . . ,C~r enumerate 
the atoms of SL(As l  . . . . .  A~I) so that 
t, 
VC'm. 
m=l  
Notice that 0 < t i < 2 r, since 01. is neither a contradiction or a tautology. 
Also, since qJ2m ------ ~ ~/2m 1, t2m = 2r - -  t2m- l "  Let C 1 . . . . .  C2, enumerate 
the atoms of SL(Ai , ,  . . . .  A i ) .  Notice that since i and the i m and sit are all 
distinct, the atoms of SL(A i ,  Ail, . . . .  Ai, ,  As] . . . . .  As) . . . . .  Asf . . . .  , As~) 
are (up to logical equivalence) ++_A iACp A Aq=l  Ck m for 1 <p < 2 n, 
1 < k m <__ 2 r. Let g be the automorphism of
B(  Ai ,  Ai~ , . . . .  A i .  , A~I, . . .  , As: . . . . .  A,~ . . . . .  A~)  
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that transposes the equivalence classes of the atoms 
q/2 
A iACpA A c2m-1  2" d  A Cem , ~ A i A Cp A 
m=l 
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q/2 
A cZm - 1 A C 2m 2 r e m 2r-din 
m=l  
for 1 < p < 2 n, 1 < din, e m <_ 2 r, and leaves all other atoms fixed. Then 
g(~)  = ~ for X ~ SL(A i ,  Ai~ . . . . .  Ai ,) ,  whilst 
g(A  i A OZm 1) = Ai A OZm_ 1, 
g(A  i A Oem ) = A i A 02m, 
g (7  A i A 02m_ 1) = 7 A i A 7 02m ,
g( 7 A i A -~ 02") = 7 A i A 02m 1, 
g(~A iA02,.)=TAiA 702,. 1, 
g(7  A i A 7 02m 1) = 7 A i A 02,., 
and hence 
g(A i~O2m- l )  =g( (A i  A Ozm ,) V (TA  i A 702m_1)   
= (A  i A 02m_1)  V (7  A i A 02m) ,
g(A i~Oz, . )=g( (A iA  02m) V (~AiA  702 , . )  ) 
= (A  i A 02m) V (7  m i A 02" . l ) 
for m = 1 . . . . .  q/2 .  Hence by P2, 
where 
S '  = S + {w(A  i A 02m) -]- w(mA i A Ozm_l )= l [m=1 . . . . .  q /2}  
+{w(A i A 02m l ) AI- w(~A i A 02m)=l [m=l  . . . . .  q /2} .  
But S'  is equivalent o 
S + {w(02" . )  =w(02"  . 1) = l [m = 1 . . . . .  q/2} ,  
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so  
= ME(S + (w(Oj)= ' l J=  1 . . . .  
= ME(S)(4,)  
by irrelevant information, P4, as required. 
, q})(4')  
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ELEMENTARY KNOWLEDGE BASES 
A second criticism of Theorem 2, the main characterization result of [1], 
is that as a domain for an inference process CL is too general, containing 
as it does knowledge bases which by no stretch of the imagination would 
ever occur naturally in the real world. The concern behind this objection 
is, presumably, that these "unnatural" knowledge bases may be essential 
for the proof of the characterization theorem (where they certainly appear 
in abundance) and that if a common sense inference process is only 
required to be defined on a smaller, more natural class of knowledge 
bases, then it need no longer be tied to being maximum entropy. 
What it means for a knowledge base S to be "natural" is, of course, 
debatable, but one formulation might be that S is elementary, that is, it has 
the form 
{w(O i) = Oli l i  = 1 . . . . .  m} 
where the 0 i ~ SL and the c~ i are real. We use CEL, etc., to denote the 
set of elementary knowledge bases on L. 
The main result of this section is that with this interpretation of 
"natural" the above-mentioned concern is unfounded; if an inference 
process satisfies common sense (as defined by the principles P1-7) on the 
elementary knowledge bases, then it must agree with the maximum en- 
tropy inference process on these knowledge bases. (Up to now we have 
defined an inference process to be a total function on CL. However, for 
the statement of the next theorem we will relax this requirement and talk 
of a partial inference process N, which need only be defined on a subset 
of CL.) 
THEOREM 6 Let N be a partial inference process which satisfies principles 
P1-7 (on its domain, dom(N))  and such that CEL c_ dom(N)  __c_ CQL 
and dom(N)  is closed under subsets and finite unions (where they are 
consistent). Then N agrees with ME on its domain. 
Since the proof of this result is rather long and messy, we refer the 
reader to [6] for the details and restrict ourselves here to a very brief 
outline. The basic idea of the proof is that for each S ~ CQL', where L '  is 
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some infinite, coinfinite subset of L, we canonically construct an S+~ CEL 
such that for N satisfying P1-7,  if S ~ dom(N)  and 0 ~ SL' then 
N(S) (O)  = N(S+)(O) .  
(The construction of  S + with this property is essentially due to Maung [7].) 
We then define an inference process M on CQL' by 
M(S) (O)  = N(S+)(O)  
for 0 ~ SL', and show first that the properties assumed of N force M to 
satisfy P1 -7  (on CQL'). Hence, by Theorem 1, M = ME (on CQL'), and 
hence for S ~ dom(N) ,  0 ~ SL', 
N(S) (O)  = N(S+)(O)  = M(S) (O)  = ME(S) (0 ) ,  
which, by varying L ' ,  shows that N = ME on dom(N) ,  
Notice that, as in the proof  of Theorem 2, if in addition we assume 
continuity, P8, then we can allow that dom(N)_c  CL, provided every 
S ~ dom(N)  is a limit point of S i ~ dom(N)  n CQL. 
REMARK We have proved this result in the framework of [1], where we 
assumed a fixed countable overlying language L. In later work (e.g. [2]), we 
instead took an inference process N to be also a function of the (finite) 
languages L1, so that for S ~ CLI, NL~(S) picks a probability function w 
on SL 1 that satisfies S. This amounts to the same thing as our treatment of 
inference processes in this paper once we make the assumption on N that 
it is language invariant, i.e., if L~ c_ L2, S ~ CL 1 c CL2, then NL2(S) 
agrees with NL'(S)  on SLy. (Note that ME is language invariant. For a 
direct proof  of this and a further discussion of language invariance we 
refer the reader to [2].) 
THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE 
The independence principle, P6, i.e. 
if S 
= {w(A 1 A A 3) = ce, w(A 2 A A 3) = /3, w(A  3) = 3/} E CL, 
where 3' > 0, 
then N(S) (A  1 A A 2 A A 3) - , 
Y 
which, in the presence of the equivalence principle, is equivalent o 
if S = w(A 1 I A 3) =- - ,w(A=IA  3) =- - ,w(A  3) = y , 
Y T 
then N(S) (  A 1 A Az l A 3) -  , 
T 
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has been criticized on the grounds that it identifies the absence of any 
information linking A~ and A 2 given A 3 with the statistical independence 
of A 1 and A 2 given A 3. Whilst those of us indoctorinated in statistics 
might agree that this identification was "common sense," it is questionable 
if the proverbial man in the street would find it so, given the well- 
documented difficulties he appears to have in appreciating statistical 
independence (see for example [8]). [No less a criticism may be directed 
against Johnson and Shore's system independence principle (see [9])--which 
in our notation amounts to stating that 
if S 1 E CL(A i l  , . . . .  A in) ,  S 2 ~ CL(A j , ,  . . . .  As,,), 
01 ~ SL(A i , ,  . . . .  Ain), and 02 ~ SL(A j , ,  . . . .  A j  ), 
where {i 1 . . . . .  i n} n {Jl . . . . .  Jm} = (~, 
then N(S  1 +$2)(01 A 02 ) =N(S I ) (01) 'N(S2) (02) ,  
- -and  against Csiszfir's very similar product consistency (see [10]).] In view 
of this criticism, it would seem desirable to replace the independence 
principle with one that was rather more universally appealing. 
In fact, we have already given a candidate for such a principle in [11], 
where we showed that in the presence of principles P1-5 and continuity, 
P8, the independence principle is equivalent o the principle 
if S 1 
and 
then 
= (w(A  1) = a ,w(A  2) = /3} e CL 
S 2 = S 1 + {w(A 3) = "y,w(A 4) = a, 
w(A 2 AA 3) = w(A 2 AA 4) = w(A 3 /kA 4) = 0} E CL 
N(S1) (A  1 A A 2) = N(S2) (A  1 A A2). 
(Actually what is shown is that the independence principle follows from 
this principle and P1-5 and P8. The other direction follows immediately 
from Theorem 2 and the fact that ME satisfies this principle.) This 
alternative principle certainly seems an improvement on P6 in the sense 
that it does not appeal to any familiarity with statistics. Instead it can be 
justified by arguing that the additional constraints added to S 1 to form S 2 
tells us nothing new about A 1 /x A 2 and hence should not influence the 
probability assigned to A 1 A A 2. 
Nevertheless, a criticism one might direct at this alternative principle is 
that it is more complicated than one would wish and that in consequence it 
may appear commonsensical simply because it is not sufficiently well 
understood. The following theorem hopefully addresses this criticism by 
showing that an essentially simpler principle suffices. 
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THEOREM 7 The independence principle, P6, follows from P1-5,  P8, and 
the following principle: 
P9 I f  
and 
S 1 = {w(A  1) = o~, w( .4  2) = /3} ~ CL 
82 = S1 -[- {w(A3) = T, w(A1 A A 3) = 0} E CL 
then N(S1) (A  1 A A 2) = N(S2)(A 1 A A2). 
Proof  Assume throughout that P1-5,  P8, and P9 hold for N. Let 
a, /3 E [0, 1], and let 
h(a , /3 )  = N(S1) (A  1 A A2) ,  
where S 1 = {w(A 1) = a ,  w(`4  2) = /3}. 
By P8 the function h is continuous. Also, by considering the (unique) 
automorphism of B(A  1, A e) for which g (~)  = ~ A 1, g(A2)  = A2 we see 
that 
N({w(A l) = 1 - ~, w(A  2)=/3}) ( .41A.4z )  
= N({w(~ A 1 ) = a ,  w(A  2 ) =/3}) (A  1 A A 2 ) 
= N({w( .41)  = a,  w(A 2) =/3}) (~ A 1 A A2), 
SO 
h(1 - c~,/3) =/3  - h(c~,/3). (2) 
The first step in the proof  is to show that h must he multiplication. Let 
S 2 = S 1 + {w(A 3) = T ,w(A  1 AA 3) = 0} ~ CL, 
so by P9, 
N(S1) (A  1 A A 2) = N(S2) (A  1 A A2)  = h(o~,/3), 
and similarly, 
N(S2) (A  2 AA3)  = h(y  ,/3).  
Now let g be the automorphism of B(A  1, A 2, A 3) which transposes 
A 1 A +A 2 A +A3,  -~ A 1 A ±A 2 A -TA 3 
but leaves all other atoms of B(A1,  A 2, A 3) fixed. Then using P1 and P2 
we find that 
N(S2) (O)  = N($3)(¢ h) whenever g (0)  = ~,  (3) 
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where 
S 3 = {w(A 1) = a ,  w(A  2) = /3, 
w((~A 1 A ~A3)  V (A  1 AA3) )  = 3" ,w(A  1 AA 3) = 0}. 
Since S 3 is equivalent o 
{w(A 1) = ot ,w(A  2) = /3, w(A  3) = 1 - a - 3" ,w(A  1 AA 3) = 0}, 
using P9 and (3) with ~b = A 2 A A3, 0 = (A 1 A A 2 A A 3) V (7  A 1 A 
A 2 A ~ A 3) gives 
h(1 - a - 3",/3) =N(S2) ( (A  1 AA 2 AA 3) V (~A 1 AA e A --n A3)) 
= N(S2) (  ~ A 1 A A z A --hA 3) 
=/3  - h ( o,, 13) - h ( 3" , /3 ).  
Using (2) (with a -'= u + 3/) gives 
h(a  + 7 , /3 )  = h(a , /3 )  + h(3' , /3) .  
This identity, together with the continuity of h and the fact that h(1, 1) = 1 
and h(a , /3 )  = h(/3, a )  (by P2), forces h to be multiplication by a well- 
known argument (see [12]). 
This completes the first half of the proof. It remains to show that the 
function q defined by 
q(a , /3 ,  3") = N(S) (A  1 A A 2 A A3)  , 
where 
S = {w(A  1 A A3)  = or, w(A 2 A A 3) = /3, w(A  3) = T} • CL,  
satisfies q (a , /3 ,  3") = a/3/3" for 3' > 0. 
Notice that q is continuous by P8. Let A i, 4_<i<n +3,  be new 
propositional variables, and let C 1 . . . . .  C2, enumerate all sentences 
n+3 
A _+Aj. 
j=4 
For 0 < m < 2 n let E m = Vim1 C i. Notice that E2, is a tautology, so we 
must have w(E2n)  = 1. 
Now for any 1 < i , j  < 2 ~ there is clearly an automorphism g of 
B (A1 , . . . ,  A ~ + 3) which transposes the pairs of atoms 
+At  A +_A 2 A -.hA 3 A Ci, +_A 1 A q-A 2 A q -h  3 A Cj 
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and is the identity of all other atoms. Since A 1 A A3, A 2 A A3, A~ are 
fixed by g, 
N(S) (  +A 1 A 4-A  2 A "I-A 3 A C i) 
= N(S) (+_A~ A ++_A 2 A +A 3 A Cj )  (by P2) 
= 2 nN(S) (+A1 A -t-A 2 A __.A3) , 
since for w a probability function 
w(+A 1 A "I-A 2 A -t-A 3) = w(-+-A 1 A -I-A 2 A -I-A 3 A E2. )  
2 n 
~_, w(  ++_A 1 A +_A 2 A ++_A 3 A Ci ) .  
i=1 
Hence 
my m7 
N(S) (A  3 A Era) = z"  ~'' ' N (S) (A  3 A ~ E m) = 7 - __2"-- 
m a ma 
N(S) (A  1 A A 3 A E m) = 2 n , N(S) (A  1 A 13  A --n E m) = ot 2 ~ , 
N(S) (A  2 A A 3 A Em)  = 
m/3 m13 
2" ' N (S) (A  2 A A 3 A ~ E m ) = [3 - 2------- ~
As above, then, 
N(S) (A  1 A A 2 A A 3 A E m) 
m 
2" q (a ,  [3 3') 
{ ma my 
= N w(A a A A 3 A E m) - 2 n , w(A  3 A E m) - 2 ~ , 
w(A  2 A A 3 A E m) = 
m ,8 m7 
2" ' w(  A3  A -7 Em)  = "y 2" ' 
mol  
w(A 1 A A 3 A ~ E m) = ce 2" ' 
w(A  2 A A 3 A -1E  m) = [3 - 2- ] -  (A  1 A A 2 A A 3 A E m) 
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by P1 and P5, 
=N((w(A3 
w( A 2 A A 3 A E m) = 
m 7 mot 
A E,,,) = --~-, w(A  1 A A 3 A E,,,) = 2" ' 
m/3 my) )  
2" 'w(~h3 AEm)  = 1 - -~-  
(A  1 A A 2 A A 3 A E m) 
by P4 (with th = A 3 A Era) , 
by P1, 
{ m 7 mot 
=N w(A  s AE  m) =-~- ,w(A  1 AA s AE  m) = 2 n , 
w(A  2 AA 3 AE  m) =- -  w(E  m) = 1 (A 1 AA 2 AA s ) 2 n , 
{ my mot 
= N w(A3)  = -~-U, w(A l  A A 3) = 2" ' 
m/3})  
w(A 2 AA 3) = 2 n , (11 AN 2 AA 3) 
(man,  my)  
=q 2 n ' 2"  ' 2"  
by P1 and P3. 
m ( rna  m/3 my)  
Hence ~2q(ot ,~,Y )  =q 2" ' 2" ' ' 
q(ot,13, Y) = Yq - - , - - ,1  
Y 7 
= TN( (w(A3)  = 
as required. 
= 7N( (w(A3)  = 
and by continuity 
1, w(A  1 A A 3) = - - ,  w(A 2 A A 3) = --  
Y 7 
(A 1 A A 2 A A 3) 
1, w(A  1) = - - ,w(A  2) = -- (A 1 AA 2) 
Y Y 
(by P1) ({ o 
= 7N w(A  1) = - - ,w(A  2) = (A  1 AA 2) 
Y 
=Th -4 ' -4  = 7 ' 
(by P3) 
98 J. Paris and A. Vencovskfi 
Notice that, as above, P9 is equivalent to the independence principle P6 
in the presence of P1-5 and P8, since, by direct calculation, ME is easily 
seen to satisfy P9. 
It is interesting to remark that the proof of this theorem actually shows 
that with P1-5 and P8, the independence principle can be simplified to 
state just that 
if S = {w(A 1) = ol, w(A2) = /3} E CL then N(S) (A  1 /k A2) = o~/3. 
However, we see no way of effecting this simplification (nor the other 
simplifications given in this section) in the absence of continuity. It is 
worth remarking, however, that we do not require the full strength of this 
principle; just assuming continuity in the constant erms /3 i appearing in 
the constraints uffices. 
The new principle P9 suggests the following generalization: 
P10 If S 1 + {w(01) = oq} ~ CL(A i ,  , . . . .  Aio) , S 2 -~- {w(02) = 0¢2} E 
CL(A j l ,  . . . .  Aim), and {i 1 . . . . .  i n) n {Jl . . . . .  Jm} = Q~, then 
N(S1 + {w(01) = ~1} + $2 + {w(02) = °L2})(01 /k 02) 
= N({w(01)  = 0/1, w(02)  = or'2})(01 /~ 02). 
Being a weakening of Johnson and Shore's system independence 
(principle) (see [9]), P10 holds for the maximum entropy inference process, 
ME. However, compared with the existing principles, P1-8, it does not 
seem to be more fundamental (in terms of subsuming other principles), 
nor even more commonsensical in this general form. 
COMPACTNESS 
In the introduction we described the idea behind the definition of an 
inference process, in short, that we imagine an expert's knowledge in a 
particular area to consist of a set S ~ CL  and that, ideally, the agent 
forms further beliefs about the various features and propositions relating 
to this "area of expertise" by using some inference process. This picture 
certainly corresponds to the basic expert system setup (which originally 
motivated [1]), where the knowledge in a particular specialized area has 
been solicted from a (human) expert and the expert system (ideally) 
applies an inference process to this knowledge base to infer further 
"beliefs" about propositions in the area. Viewed in this way, the "expert" 
here (in the sense of this paper) is the expert system itself, although there 
appears to be an unwritten assumption amongst many knowledge engi- 
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neers that the human expert is working in a rather similar fashion 2 
(an assumption which in turn provides a possible justif ication for giving 
credence to the system's inferences). 
In bui lding expert systems in this way (i.e., by soliciting knowledge from 
an establ ished human expert)  there appears  to be an underlying assump- 
tion that in order  to infer beliefs in a special ized area it is sufficient to 
work with a knowledge base in essential ly this area (once the key features 
have been identif ied and named).  Obviously this is an assumption born, at 
least partly, of necessity, since it would clearly be total ly impractical  to 
at tempt to elicit all the expert 's knowledge over all areas and not just in 
the part icular  area under  direct considerat ion.  
Unfortunately,  this assumption does not hold in general for ME,  as is 
rather easy to see. For  suppose that S consists of constraints 
w(Ai+ 1) = (1  - -  e)w(Ai) for i = 1 . . . . .  n - 1, 
w(A  1) = (1 -- e.)W(An) , 
where E is small. Then, clearly, if w satisfies S, then w(A 1) = 0, so 
ME(S) (A  1) = 0. However,  it is easy to check that for small E, if we drop 
just one constraint  from S, then ME gives A 1 a value close to one-half.  In 
this sense, then, ME is as badly incompact as can be. 
This raises the quest ion whether  there might be other  inference pro- 
cesses which do not suffer this failing. In fact, we shall show that within a 
reasonable not ion of  what we mean by "compactness"  this is not this case: 
any inference process N must be " incompact"  (although without further 
assumptions on N we cannot show that it necessari ly fails quite as 
spectacularly as it does with ME). Loosely, the compactness assumption on 
N amounts  to requiring, at least, that for any knowledge base S ~ CL and 
A i ~ L, there is a "smal l"  subset S'  of  S that a lready contains almost all 
the relevant informat ion about A i (according to N)  that is present in S. 
This certainly amounts to requir ing of N that N(S) (A  i) is close to 
N(S ' ) (A i ) ,  and indeed that N(S" ) (A  i) is close to N(S) (A  i) whenever  
S' c_ S" c_ S. To be precise, let us agree that N is compact if there exists 
k 0 such that whenever  S ~ CL, A i ~ L, then there is some S'  _c S such 
that 
1 IS'l _< ~lSI + ko 
2 Notice that if the human expert were working in this way with a knowledge base S and an 
inference process N satisfying obstinacy, then it would not be necessary for him/her to have 
a basic knowledge K specified precisely. Inadvertently including also beliefs which are 
inferred from K, rather than being items of "basic knowledge," would make no difference to 
the values inferred via N. 
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and 
S '_S"_  IN(S)(A i) - N(S" ) (A i ) [  <_ ~ for all c c S. 
Then with this definition, 
THEOREM 8 There are no compact  inference processes. 
Proof  Let n be large and e very small (even in compar ison with n - l ) .  
For  i = 1 . . . . .  n - 1, let E) be the set consisting of the single constraint 
w(Ai+ 1) = (1 - e)w(A i )  , and let E~ = {w(A 1) = (1 - e)w(A, , )} .  Simi- 
larly, for i = 1 . . . . .  n -  1, let E~ be the set consisting of the single 
constraint w(A, ,+ i+ l )  = (1 - e)w(A, ,+ i ) ,  and let E 2 = {w(An+ l) = (1 - 
e)w(A2n)}.  Notice that if w satisfies U~_ t Ei I then w(A~)  = O, but that if 
just one E) is omitted from this union, then there is a solution with 
3 (and similarly for the E~, etc.). w(A~)  = 
For  i = 1 . . . . .  n let 
= =3},  Si I E) U U E2 A {w(A, VAn+ ,) 
j= l , j~ i  j= l  
and 
n 0 + ~}- s~= UE) u E~u{w(A, vAo ,)=3 
j= l  j= l , j4=i  
w(A, )  = O. 
Now assume that 
Ji k c_ S(  be such that 
Notice that if w satisfies S] then w(A I) = 3 , whilst if w satisfies S 2 then 
N is compact,  and for i=  1 , . . . ,n ,  k = 1,2, let 
and 
115~1 + k0 I/~kl ~ .~ 
1 IN ( J ) (A , )  - N(S ik ) (A l ) l  <_ ~ for Ji k c J  c Si k. 
IS)l, so for each Notice that by this first inequality, since n is large, [ J i l [< 
i = 1 , . . . ,n ,  
n 
I{m[E  2 nJ,~ =Q}I  > ~.  
Hence 
n 2 
[ ( ( i ,m)  [ EZra N J i  I = 0 ,  1 < i, m <_ n}l > - -  
2 '  
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and similarly 
n 2 
I{(m,b I EL n J, 2 = O, 1 < i, m < n}l > -~-. 
Since both these sets are subsets of the set 
{(i,m} ll < i ,m <n}, 
which has cardinality n2, they must have some pair, (u, v ) say, in common. 
For this pair then, 
E~ n ] :  = El n : :  = G. 
Furthermore, since Ji k c_ S~ and E :  n S/~ = Q, 
El n J2 = E~. n ]?  = 0 ,  
so E 2, E 1 are both disjoint from J2 U j,2. But then 
J2 ~-]2 u]~. ~_s~, 
Jr? - J : c  1 U J,,2 c_S 2, 
so, by assumption, 
]N(]2 u L?)(A1) -N(s l ) (A , ) I  <-- ¼, 
1 INfJ2 U J,2)(A 1) -Nfsz)fA,) I  < ~. 
But this gives the required contradiction, since, as observed earlier, we 
3 must have N(SI)(A1) = ~ and N(SZXA1) = O. • 
It is clear that we could sharpen this result to apply to weaker versions 
of compactness. However, the added complication of doing so seems 
pointless, given that our present version is already well below any practical 
useful notion of compactness that we might have hoped for. 
The "circular" knowledge bases employed in this proof may appear 
rather artificial. Nevertheless the (apparent) practical infeasibility of the 
Hamiltonian circuit problem (see [13]) leaves little hope that, in general 
knowledge bases, such circularities could tractably be detected. Of course 
it may be that the knowledge bases we encounter in practice are, for some 
reason, sufficiently special that they do admit an acceptable degree of 
compactness. Such would appear to be part of the philosophy underlying 
Bayesian networks, for example. 
Notice, however, that these rather unnatural constraints, 
w(Ai+ 1) = (1 - E)w(Ai), 
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used in the proof could, by a minor modification of the parameters used in 
the definition of compactness be replaced by the (arguably more natural) 
pairs of constraints 
w(Ai+11 Ai) = 1 - E, 
w(Ai+ 1 [ --7 A i) = O. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have argued against criticisms of the maximum entropy 
inference process in general, and of its justification in terms of common 
sense principles in [1] in particular, namely that ME is representation 
dependent, hat the knowledge bases considered in [1] are too general, and 
that the identification in that paper of ignorance of dependence with 
probabilistic independence is unjustified. 
At the same time we have raised a criticism of ME (and, as we showed, 
of inference processes in general), namely incompactness, which we have 
done nothing to dispel. Potentially this would seem to be a rather 
widespread problem with current expert system methodologies, its dis- 
missal being based, seemingly, on an act of faith that in practice any such 
incompactness would be apparent. 
There are, of course, other criticisms that could be leveled against some 
of the principles used in [1]. In particular the assumption of continuity 
could be questioned, given that it is scarcely the simple "continuity in the 
parameters" that one might have expected by common sense considera- 
tions. In fact, as alluded to earlier, the proof of the main theorem of [1] for 
CQL does not use continuity at all; it is only required when widening the 
result to CRL. It would be satisfying if even there continuity could be 
dispensed with. 
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